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Breaking Out of the Regulatory Dilemma:

Alternatives to the Sterile Choice
ROGER

G. NOLL*

Economic research has played an important role in the current debate over regulatory policy. Since 1959, economists have generated
massive literature on the economic consequences of regulation.' By
1975, the leading spokesman for regulatory reform in the federal
government was an economist who had contributed several important
studies, ranging from a book on the origins of the Interstate Commerce Commission to a statistical analysis of the effects of Federal
Power Commission regulation of natural gas field prices.2
To my knowledge, no economic evaluation of a regulatory activity
has produced a clean bill of health for the policy under review. Economists uniformly find immense indirect costs due to regulation, with
little or no benefit. While most of these findings pertain to the regulation of entry, prices, and profits in the major infrastructural industries,
the results with respect to safety and environmental regulation are essentially the same, although here the results are less convincing.'
The natural inference from these studies is that regulation has
uniformly failed and ought to be dispensed with, or at least drastically
reformed. But this conclusion does not necessarily follow from the
recitation of the research results.
Empirical estimates of the "cost of regulation" are normally
measures of the extent to which the performance of an industry departs
*Professor of Economics, California Institute of Technology. Financial support for
preparing this paper was provided by the National Science Foundation RANN program,
grant #APR75-16566. I would like to express my deep gratitude to Richard Posner for
his comments and suggestions with regard to the footnotes.
I The seminal work is 3. MEYER, M. PECK, J. STENASoN & C. ZwicK, THE EcoNxo-cs
oF COMPETITION IN THE TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY (1959). While this study was hardly
the first to criticize regulatory policy, it was a major advance in the sophistication and
completeness of research on regulatory effects.
2 See P. M~cAvoY, TaE EFFEcTs oF REGuLATioN: THE TRUNKLINE RALROAD CARTELS
AND T m ICC BEFoRE 1900 (1965), and MacAvoy, THE REGULATION-INDUCED SHORTAGE
OF NATURAL GAS, 14 J. LAW & ECON. 167 (1970).
3Two highly publicized studies of safety regulation, both by S. Peltzman, are The
Effect of Automobile Safety Regulation, 83 3. POL. EcON. 677 (1975) and REGULATION OF PH1ARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION: THE 1962 AMXENDMENTS (1974).

For an examin-

ation of consumer and occupational safety programs, see Cornell, Noll and Weingast,
Safety Regulation, in SETTING NATIONAL PRIORITrIEs: THE COMING DECADE (H. Owen and
C. Schultze ed. 1976).
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from maximal efficiency-that is, from a situation in which price is
equal to the additional costs incurred in producing the last unit of output and total output is produced at the minimum feasible cost. Practically speaking, this will occur only if an industry is perfectly competitive. Consequently, the estimates of the costs of regulation constitute
a case for deregulation only if an industry would be perfectly competitive in the absence of government intervention.
In many cases the principal barrier to competition is, in fact,
regulation. Examples are trucking, trunk airlines, agricultural commodities subject to marketing orders, securities markets, banking, and
local passenger transportation. In these cases the only sensible issue is
how to devise a reasonable transition to the deregulated state. In other
instances, it is likely that deregulation would not result in perfect competition. The relevant policy issue in these cases is which alternative
is least costly. Here the choices are not easy because the alternatives
that are normally considered all have serious liabilities.
INHERENT PROBLEMS OF REGULATIONS

As a procedure for controlling market behavior, the administrative
process has certain inherent. weaknesses. The first arises because it is
a process in which policy decisions are made by passive, judicial-like
officials on the basis of information supplied to them in a formal adversary proceeding. This procedure creates the dilemma of bias or delay.
If only some interested parties are represented in a proceeding, the
dependence of decisions on the content of the formal record causes
decisions generally to favor those who are represented. If all parties
are represented in a proceeding, the amount of information fed into
the process, the time spent responding to points made by opponents, and
the greater care required to write a decision that will withstand appeal
all add considerably to the time the agency takes to make a decision,
and to the direct cost of the process. To illustrate, in 1973 AEC cases
involving issuance of construction permits for nuclear power plants
averaged six months in duration when no one participated but the
applicant, and 29 months when an intervenor was granted full standing. More generally, the source of much of the recent criticism that
the regulatory process is too slow has been the growing use of intervention by environmentalists and consumer groups. While agencies have
responded to these new circumstances by streamlining some procedures,"
they can never succeed completely and still satisfy procedural require4

See Joskow, Inflation and Environmental Concern: Structural Change in the Process

of Public Utility Regulation, 17 J. LAw & EcoN. 291 (1974).
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ments. Attempts to short circuit normal procedures, such as by denying standing to intervenors or resorting to informal processes, have
been attempted, but have been sternly rebuked by the courts. 5
A second general problem of the administrative process is its inherent conservatism. Typically the burden of proof is on those who
would change the status quo. They must demonstrate through evidence that a change in regulatory rules and policies is desirable. Prior
to the mid-1960's, when the rate of inflation was generally below the
rate of productivity advance in public utility sectors, the utilities benefited from this characteristic of regulation. In that period the proper
direction of change was for price reductions, with the burden of proof
on those who would force utilities to cut prices. In the 1970's, with
costs on the rise and the appropriate direction of change in the opposite
direction, the burden of proof has switched to utilities. As a result,
utilities have moved from a period in which their rates of return generally exceeded the cost of capital to one in which many utilities, if not
facing bankruptcy, at least are not sufficiently profitable to attract new
capital.6
The conservatism of regulatory agencies is partly related to the
representation problem discussed above. In order to find it worthwhile
to be represented in the regulatory process, a group must perceive
the stake it has in the issue at hand. Suppose the issue is the adoption
of a new technology or the prohibition of a possibly hazardous substance. In both cases, those who derive their income from existing
methods are more likely to be aware of their stakes in the issue than
are those who would gain from change. Workers who would be employed in the use of the new technology once it is standardized have
not been hired when its adoption is debated, nor are all of those who
are threatened by a hazardous substance likely to be aware of the
danger. In the debate over cable regulations before the FCC, for example,
the cable television industry has been represented by an association comprised of existing systems, yet the key to the development of cable
is the set of regulations that now keep cable out of most of the 100
largest metropolitan areas. Since some of the entrepreneurs who would
invest in such systems are not yet in the industry, and some of the industry's potential customers are not yet fully aware of the nature of
5See, e.g., Moss v. CAB, 430 F.2d 981 (D.D.C. 1970). See also the statement of
COMMITrEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS AND COMMITTEE ON

Ruben B. Robertson, in
COMMERCE

Or THE U. S. SENATE, To ESTABLISH AN INDEPENDENT CONSUMER PROTECTION

AGENcy: JOINT HEARNGS, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973).
6See Joskow, supra note 4, and Joskow & MacAvoy, Regulation and the Financial

Condition of the Electric Power Companies in the 1970's, 65 Am. EcoN. Rzv. 295 (1975).
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the service that might be offered them, the representation of cable is
not in the same proportion to its stake in the issue as is that of commercial broadcasters. 7 And because cable interests have fewer resources
to commit to the regulatory process, they presumably will be less effective in dealing with the regulators, assuming, of course, that the
quality of representation is important in determining outcomes.
A third problem inherent in regulation is the inflexibility that arises
from the decision theory that underpins it. The basic model of the
regulatory decisionmaker is an expert philosopher-king. Two important
assumptions lie behind this model: (1) that an unambiguous "best"
decision exists "in the public interest" and (2) that it can be identified by
an expert through collecting, analyzing, and evaluating information about
the problem. Social science theory is firm in rejecting the first assumption, whether the test be the maximization of real economic output or
majority approval in a political process. In both cases, indeterminancies
8
are the rule, rather than the exception.
The second assumption is invalid in cases in which the information
base is insufficient to enable the problem to be solved, regardless of the
objective. Cases in which a regulatory issue is subject to considerable,
irreducible uncertainty are common, yet these are treated no differently
from cases in which information is relatively complete and of high
quality.9 In both types of circumstances, the agency is expected to use
its expertise in identifying a "best" solution.
The aura of expertise is important for an agency to maintain, for
it is one of the main weapons (the other is the development of a constituency) an agency uses in the process by which it obtains approval
for its budget and legislative program. 0 Consequently, for both theoretical and practical reasons, an agency has powerful reasons to convey
the image that it has solved problems. Yet, as more information becomes
7 For a more complete treatment of the representation problem, see Noll, Government
Administrative Behavior: A Multidisciplinary Survey (Social Science Working Paper #62,
Calif. Inst. of Tech., 1975). For a more thorough treatment of the application of these
arguments to cable television, see R. NoLL, M. PEcx & J. McGowAN, EcoNoMIc AsPzEs
op TELEvmSIoN REGULATIoN, chs. 4 & 7 (1973).
8
The weakest conditions under which GNP maximization leads to an unambiguously
preferred position are that all people have identical tastes and place equal value on an

increment to their incomes. See Chipman & Moore, The New Welfare Economics: 19391974 (mimeo, Dep't of Econ., U. of Minn., 1974). Recent empirical work has confirmed
the presence of cyclic social preferences in actual decisionmaking situations. See Plott &

Levine, On Using the Agenda to Influence Group Decisions: Theory, Experiments and an
Application, Am. Ecox. Ray. [forthcoming] and Social Science Working Paper
#66, Calif. Inst. of Tech., 1975.
9 For example, see Joskow, Approving Nuclear Power Plants: Scientific Dedsionmaking
or Administrative
Charade?, 5 B=nr. J. Ecox. & MA4N. Scr. 320 (1974).
10
See A. WILDAvscY, TBE PoLTICs op mE BuDGorARY PRoczss (1964).
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available, the "best" solution to a policy problem will change, if for
no other reason than that less uncertainty will be attached to the problem
and hence there will be less reason to act conservatively and to maintain numerous options for future action. But to change the policy explicitly through time is to create doubt about one's expertise. Consequently, the agency has an incentive to keep old policies in place even
after the information base is sufficient for experts to know that the
original policy was an inferior choice.
Examples of this tenacious clinging to outdated policies abound in
regulation. Recent examples include:
" the ambient oxidant air quality standard of the Environmental
Protection Agency, which was set in 1971 at .08 parts per million
on the basis of an arithmetic mistake in calculating the threshold
at which damaging health effects could be observed; EPA has known
about the mistake since no later than early 1973; by late 1976
it had not yet changed the standard to an appropriate figure
based on correct calculations (the standard should be between .15
and .20, and the difference would cause about a 75 percent reduction in the costs of meeting the standard) 1
" the commitment by the FCC to the development of UHF television
as the principal means of increasing competition in the broadcast
industry, based upon engineering testimony in the early 1950's that
technical parity between UHF and VHF was only a few years
away; however, after 25 years UHF is a financial disaster area,
while its signal quality is still poor for homes more than a few
miles from the transmitter, yet the FCC is still committed to UHF
satellite-to-home broadcasting, or
rather than to cable television,
2
spectrum reallocation.1
A final difficulty with regulation is that Congress has a strong
incenitve to do too much of it. A recent study of the dramatic increase
since the mid-1960's in the frequency with which incumbent congressmen of both parties are successful in being reelected identifies government regulation as playing a major role."3 The principal finding is
that congressmen are reelected on the basis of their role as ombudsman
for constituents who are deep in a morass of federal red tape, of which
a regulatory proceeding is one example. Successful congressmen campaign on the theme that they are "Your man in Washington who can
help you," and allocate most of their staff to locations in the home district where they devote most of their time to dealing with citizen com11Downing, Controlling Oxidants in Los Angeles, 4 EVRmoNmENTAL ArPAms 707,
711, 712 (1975).
12 See R. NoLL, M. PEcK & J. McGOwAN, supra note 7.
IsFiorina, The Case of the Vanishing Marginals: The Bureaucracy Did It (Social
Science Working Paper #100, Calif. Inst. of Tech., 1975.
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plaints. The congressman's stand on the issues and his general ideological persuasion are of decreasing importance to his reelectability.
The theoretical basis for this development is the idea of "rational
ignorance" in economic theories of voting behavior.' 4 A voter has
essentially no effect on election outcomes, and so has no incentive to
put forth effort in learning about the issue positions of candidates.
Furthermore, even if he does obtain information about each andidate,
he can also observe that few congressmen have real, identifiable power
in Congress and that rarely does a single representative's vote carry an
issue. All other things being equal, a voter may vote for the candidate
nearer his own persuasion on issues, but for the foregoing reasons his
commitment to that behavior is slight. On the other hand, as more
and more economic activity becomes regulated, the chances increase
that any given citizen will find it useful to have a congressman intervene
on his behalf in some administrative proceeding. In this role the congressman is not one of 436 representatives and 100 senators, but a
single individual with undiluted influence. At some point in the growth
of government regulation, a reputation for helping citizens in shepherding their way through administrative processes will dominate issue
positions as the determining factor in voter behavior. Even a legislator
who continually favors more regulation of the kind that generates
citizen complaints will not pay much of a price for taking this position
if he does a good job servicing the complaints, since his vote establishing the new domain of regulation usually will be unknown to some and,
in any event, uncritical to the passage of the legislation, whereas his
performance as ombudsman is easily observable and undiluted. From
the point of view of the legislator, the process generates an incentive
further to secure one's reelectability by passing laws that will increase
the demand for an ombudsman in Washington.
From the preceeding recitation of some natural inefficiences of
regulation, the findings that regulated industries do not approach the
competitve norm should hardly be surprising. Nor does it prove that
regulation is never justified. The principal point is that regulation is a
rather blunt instrument of economic policy that should be adopted only
if the alternatives are quite undesirable.
ALTERNATIVES TO REGULATION

Unfortunately, neither scholars nor politicians have been particularly creative in generating alternatives to the often unsatisfactory
14 A. DowNs, Ax Ecoio

c THEoRY or Docncy (1957).
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choice between regulation or unfettered markets. Yet alternatives do
exist, some well-known and some not. Since the most promising ideas
vary according to the type of regulatory problem, several classes of
regulatory activities will be considered separately.
Natural Monopoly
The task of regulating industries in which economies of scale or
economies of integration are present raises an additional inherent problem. The economic calculus provides us with no workable method of
setting prices in industries with average costs that decline as output increases. If price is set equal to the additional costs incurred in producing the last unit of output, the industry will not generate enough
revenues to cover costs. Any practical method for recovering total costs
-- through prices based on average costs or through a tax-subsidy system-creates inefficiency. Furthermore, unless one is willing to adopt
a separate price structure for each individual, in general one can not
even make unambiguous judgments about which of numerous price
structures is superior, including the much-maligned cross-subsidization
practice of public utilities commissions. 15
Public utility regulation adds another problem to natural monopoly
pricing. About the only way to regulate prices is on the basis of costs,
and any attempt to peg profits to costs generates an incentive to increase
costs whenever revenues can be increased by raising prices.1 6
Since deregulation of public utility monopolies seems quite attractive, the dilemma of regulation or nothing is particularly tragic in
dealing with natural monopoly. Alternatives should be welcome.
The literature provides some ideas. One proposal is to have firms
bid competitively for monopoly franchises of fixed duration. Although
as stated this is unattractive because it "solves" the monopoly problem
simply by transferring the monopoly rents to the government (the
monopoly prices remain), in slightly altered form it holds some promise.' Government could specify a standard of performance and offer the
franchise to the firm promising to meet the standard at the lowest price.
Or government could ask each firm to submit a bid that combined price
and service specifications, and select that which in combination appeared most attractive. In practice, this has been the mechanism
15McNicol, A Critique of the Debate on Deregulation (mimeo, Dep't of Econ., U. of
Pa., 1975). For the traditional wisdom on cross-subsidization, see Posner, Taxation by
Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcoN. & MAN.Sci. 22 (1971).
16See McNicol & Phillips, Theoretical Models of Rate Regulation: A Survey and
Critique (Fels Center of Government Discussion Paper No. 77, U. of Pa., 1975).

17 Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities, 11 J. LAw & EcoN. 55 (1968).
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adopted by most local governments in granting franchises for cable
television systems. It has two problems. First, a firm that errs on the
low side in estimating costs will probably win the franchise and proceed
to fail financially, during which time service will probably be degraded
as the firm fights for survival. Second, in cases in which capital assets
have very long lives-railroads, electric utilities, gas companies--either
the duration of the franchise has to be quite long or some provision
must be made for reimbursing the original owner for the value of the
capital remaining after his tenure as franchisee has expired. While
neither of these problems is particularly grave for cable televisionservice degradation is annoying but hardly threatening to the foundations of society, and systems last about ten years-they may be fatal
for some other utilities. But it could work in some cases. Feeder airline
routes are an example.
Another alternative is public ownership of utilities. Public ownership has several attractive features. It would not, presumably, be motivated solely by profits, and hence might not attempt to capture monopoly
revenues. It avoids the costly and time-consuming regulatory process,
which paid off to municipal utilities during the energy crisis. Municipals
were able to adjust prices to changing fuel -costs and the generally rising costs of new generation facilities more rapidly than were regulated
private companies.
The main liability of public ownership is that municipals have less
of an incentive to produce at lowest cost. Because they lack pure profit
motives, they have some incentive to incur unnecessary costs that improve the welfare of employees, that secure political advantage for
incumbent politicians, and that pursue interesting but probably uneconomic technical ideas of intellectual interest to management.
One little noted research paper suggests a policy that might capture
the benefits of municipal ownership, of profit orientation, and of competition. Of course, it entails a small sacrifice-the eschewing of the
scale economies of natural monopoly! The findings of the research
paper are that in forty-odd cities across the country electric utilities
actually compete for customers, and that when they do, both prices and
costs are lower. s These situations are all duopolies, and all involve one
private and one public firm. In each case parallel electric lines are
strung in the areas of competition, and households can buy service from
either firm. Apparently natural monopoly does exist, for the average
costs of these firms decline with increased output; however, monopoly
18 Primeaux, A Reexamination of the Monopoly Market Structure for Electric Utilities,
in PRoMT
o ComEImIO IN REGULATED MLUMs (A. Philips ed. 1975).
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firms tend to operate less efficiently. In cities under about 25,000 population the monopolists' average costs are sufficiently high that two firms
without full expolitation of scale economies are more efficient than one
with all scale economies captured.
Safety Regulation
This particular class of regulatory activities covers controls over
the hazards of products or employments that are visited directly upon
the participants in the market-e.g., on consumers of the product or
employees engaged in its production. It excludes policies to reduce the
effects on third parties, such as regulation of pollution or radiation.
The principal alternative to safety regulation is not the absence of
any intervention; persons damaged by products or employments have
resort to civil litigation to recover damages owing to producer negligence. In the age of doctor strikes over medical malpractice insurance rates, the problems of using legal remedies need hardly be belabored. Basically, civil remedies pose two major problems: they are
expensive (lawyers claim as much as half of the take, and the judicial
system is expensive to operate), and the damage awards have little
relation to actual damages, especially if the defendant is insured and
the case is tried before a jury. As with natural monopoly, the alternative to regulation is not very attractive.
In order to generate superior alternatives for safety regulation, the
source of the political demand for this type of intervention must be
explored in greater detail. One source is surely the inefficiency of the
judicial system as a mechanism for protection. Another is the cost an
individual faces in acquiring sufficient information to make good choices
among products. Product information comes in two ways: casual experience through purchases and observations of the consequences of
purchases by others; and study of the information on product quality
produced by journalists, consumer organizations, and government. If
a product is inexpensive, purchased frequently, and much studied by
others, quality information is relatively easy to obtain: however, if a
product is purchased infrequently, is expensive, requires considerable
technical sophistication to understand, and is not widely discussed in
the media, information about its quality is expensive. In this case, an
individual has an incentive to delegate the assessment of product quality
to an expert. It is duplicative for every person to absorb all the relevant
information on every product, and hence learning costs can be saved if
some people trust the judgment of others. Even if people differ suf-
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ficiently in tastes that they would make different selections with identical
information, delegation can still be optimal if the inefficiencies of
delegation are small compared to the costs of acquiring the ability to
make an informed selection.
The preceding discussion suggests two important points. First, if
information becomes cheaper, fewer decisions will be delegated and
more information will be acquired and processed. The greater the
diversity of tastes on a safety issue, the greater ought to be the reliance
placed on information rather than regulation. For example, many issues of food purity are more matters of aesthetics than of health. This
suggests that mandatory labeling of, say, percent insect parts and
rodent hairs is preferable to a universal standard.
Even when the issue is health, individuals can differ in their attitudes towards risk, particularly when the costs of risk-avoidance are
high. For example, lawn mowers are known to be an important source
of fairly serious injuries. Studies of the source of injuries aid the
costs of avoiding them indicate that a substantial proportion of injuries could be avoided by adding a few design features to lawn mowers
that would increase their costs about $40.19 The data are sufficient to
print on each lawn mower the probabilities of serious injury for machines
with and without the safety features, leaving the decision about which
to buy up to the consumer.
When resort is made to setting standards, it should b6 kept in mind
that the object is to diverge as little as possible from "representative"
informed behavior. An expert body for assembling and judging information about alternative standards surely has an indispensable role,
since the very cases for which the demand for standards is greatest are
those involving the most sophisticated, complicated products. Yet experts, by their decision to take up careers in the prosecution of safety
policies, are probably atypically concerned about safety issues.
The obvious alternative is to dispense with the decisionmaking
power of the expert, and with the procedural requirements as well.
Safety rules would still be propounded by expert bodies, but without
regard to administrative procedures. And safety rules could be appealed
not to the courts but to Congress. Congress would then adopt the
proposed new standards, establish new ones, or just fail to act. In the
last case, the expert body could, of course, promulgate a new set of
standards. In the event the expert body established standards to which
19 Economic Impact of Proposed Lawn Mower Safety Standards (mimeo, Consumers
Union, 1975).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 51:686

no appeal is made in some reasonable period of time (a few months),
the standards would become binding legislation.
Many variations on the preceeding theme are possible, but the basic
idea is to separate the process for evaluating information from the
ultimate policy responsibility and to free the former from the inherent
weaknesses of the administrative process without sacrificing anyone's
rights. The resulting process is rather like zoning by local government,
in which planning commissions do most of the work but city or county
councils make the tough decisions. By placing the rulemaking responsibility in Congress, the present philosophy of procedural review
of regulatory decisions would be replaced by a substantive, political review. It would also prevent congressmen from being unaccountable
for the costs of regulation while reaping political rewards through their
role as ombudsmen. Congress, not some executive or independent bureaucrat, would become the source of the red tape that generates citizen
complaints.
This mechanism is likely to be significantly more flexible than is
the administrative process. Generally speaking, Congress seems more
inclined to repeal or amend legislation than agencies are inclined to
change standards. In the area of safety regulation, Congress has occasionally left to itself the job of setting regulatory standards, notably
in dealing with automobile safety. The enactment and then, in the
face of widespread criticism from both industry and consumerists, repeal
of the automobile ignition-seat belt interlock to prevent driving without
use of belts illustrates the point, standing in stark contrast to the EPA's
tenacious devotion to its oxidant standard.
All of these arguments suggest that making Congress the standardsetter reduces many of the costs inherent in the regulatory process. Of
course this approach will not lead to the bliss of the perfectly competitive
equilibrium, and hence will generate economic studies detailing its costs.
Nevertheless, these costs are likely to be less than those incurred through
the administrative process.
Environmental Regulation
The class of regulatory policies falling under the rubric of environmental regulation includes controls on third-party effects of economic activity. While air and water pollution and noise abatement policies are
obvious examples, also included are nuclear safety regulation and land
use planning.
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Environmental problems provide the strongest argument for government intervention in private market decisions, yet they pose probably
the most difficult policy problems. They arise because some economic
activities impose uncompensated costs on parties that are not engaged
in the production or use of the product of the economic activity. Such
circumstances arise because the political and legal system has not defined
enforceable property rights that can be transacted in markets. In most
instances, the absence of tradable rights is traceable to high costs of defining and enforcing them. For example, the rights of each person to
his "fair share" of air, which can be maintained in a pure state or traded
to a rendering plant, cannot be defined in a way that conveys to each
person an independent, tradable property. In the absence of a market
for air, firms have an incentive to use it intensively as an input to production processes-it is a free yet productive resource. Consequently,
firms that follow cost-minimizing strategies will pollute long past the
point at which the benefit of pollution to the firm begins to fall short of
the cost of pollution to its receptors.
The problems of regulating environmental degradation are especially difficult. For the same set of reasons that environmental property
rights are difficult to establish and trade, regulatory standards are very
difficult to enforce. And because of the absence of direct markets for
environmental resources, identification of the optimum degree of environmental degradation is, practically speaking, impossible, even if scientific
knowledge were complete enough-which it is not-to provide an
understanding of the relationship between emissions and damages.
The economics literature has focused on taxation as an alternative
to standard-setting. 2 One advantage of emissions taxes compared to
standards is that they require less detailed knowledge about the optimal
abatement strategies for each class of polluter and less uniformity of
treatment among polluters. Also important-and inseparable-is the
issue of who would set either tax rates or standards. For the reasons
advanced in the discussion of safety standards, a case can be made for
leaving to Congress the ultimate responsibility for setting either tax
rates or standards, for making the role of the expert more advisory, and
for relaxing the requirements of the traditional administrative procedures
that are imposed upon the expert body.
20

See generally Baumol & Oates, The Use of Standards and Prices for Protection oj
the Environment, 73 SWEDISH J. ECON. 42 (1971). For a specific application, see Hausgaard, Proposed Tax on Sulphur Content of Fossil Fuels, 88 PuB. UTh. FoRThIGETLy
27 (1971) and S. 3057, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
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In addition, because environmental problems arise from a failure to
define tradable property rights, more attention should be given to creating surrogate markets that would'have the same effect on pollution as
would a market for environmental resources. One such possibility is the
creation of tradable pollution licenses, distributed to all citizens, which
sum to the overall emissions standards promulgated by legislation.2
Polluters would then bid for these licenses to pollute, and abatement
would be achieved at least cost without the government needing to investigate the technical and economic aspects of alternative abatement
strategies. The advantages of this system compared to taxes are twofold. First, the government can directly determine the acceptable level
of pollution without bothering to take on the impossible task of calculating the tax rate that would achieve it. 2 Second, the license system
avoids conveying the mistaken impression that it is possible to set a
tax that represents the cost to society of an additional unit of pollution.
By reducing the information requirements for setting standards and the
misplaced aura of scientific precision that surrounds them, the policymaking process is likely to be less costly and more flexible.
CONCLUSION

The purpose of this paper has been to contribute some perspective
to economic analyses of the regulatory process by emphasizing that economically optimal institutional arrangements for coping with problems
of market failure are not likely to be found and by pointing out that
policymakers and researchers have not treated seriously enough some
of the alternative approaches to dealing with these problems.
In adopting regulatory policies, the policymakers seem to have lost
sight of the source of the objections to market outcomes that might
Justify intervention. The policy issues examined here-decreasing cost
industries, safety, and environmental protection-arise not because decentralized decisions are inherently faulty, but because some important
feature of a well-functioning decentralized process is missing, e.g., numerous participants in the market, cheap and reliable information, or
tradable property rights. Regulation creates a centralized authority with
the job of attempting to guess how decisions might be altered if these
problems did not exist. It does not try to patch these holes in the market
so that decentralized decisions can still be the primary determinant of
21

For a detailed exposition, see Montgomery, Markets in Licenses and Efficient
Pollution Control Programs, 5 J. Ecoze. THEoRY 1272 (1972).
22
See Griffin, An Econometric Evaluation of Sulfur Taxes, 82 J. PoL. EcoN. 669
(1974).
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economic outcomes. The arguments in this paper constitute pleas for
greater emphasis on the latter approach and, when that is not feasible,
for less formality, greater dependence on the political system, and greater
honesty about the precision with which "optimal" performance criteria
can be established and enforced than is typical of regulatory processes.

